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Abstract 
Despite growing interest in the geographies of death, loss and remembrance, 
comparatively little geographical research has been devoted to either the historical and 
cultural practices of death, or to an adequate conceptualization of finitude. Responding 
to these absences, this paper argues for the importance of the notion of finitude within 
the history and philosophy of geographical thought. Situating finitude initially in the 
context of the work of Torsten Hägerstrand and Richard Hartshorne, the notion is 
argued to be both productive of a geographical ethics, and as epistemologically 
constitutive of phenomenological apprehensions of ‘earth’ and ‘world’. In order to 
better grasp the sense and genealogy of finitude, the paper turns to the work of Martin 
Heidegger, Michel Foucault and Georges Bataille. These authors are drawn upon 
precisely because their writings present powerful conceptual frameworks that 
demonstrate the intimate relations between spatiality, death and finitude. At the same 
time, their writings are critically interrogated in the light of perhaps the most important 
aspect of the conceptual history of finitude: the way in which it has been articulated as a 
site of anthropocentric distinction. The paper argues for a critical deconstruction of this 
anthropocentric basis to finitude; a deconstruction that raises a series of profound 
questions over the ethics, normativities and understandings of responsibility shaping 
contemporary ethical geographies of the human and non-human. In so doing, the paper 
demonstrates the geographical importance of the notion of finitude for a variety of 
arenas of debate that include: phenomenological understandings of spatiality; the 
biopolitical boundaries drawn between human and animal; and contemporary 
theorizations of corporeality, materiality and hospitality. 
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Introduction 
Writing in the context of the 1970s global oil crises, and the concrete realization of the 
accuracy of M K Hubbert’s prediction concerning peak oil production, Torsten 
Hägerstrand provided perhaps the first geographical analysis of finitude. In a paper 
entitled ‘Geography and the study of interaction between nature and society’ he voiced 
concern about the kind of ethical dispositions shaping modern society: ‘What seems to 
be particularly dangerous in the present situation is that the human imagination…does 
not appear to grasp finitudes intuitively’ (1976: 333). For Hägerstrand, a society based 
upon the principles of production, accumulation and consumption struggles to grasp the 
finite nature of ecological relations. In so doing the intimate relations that compose 
different ecologies can be destroyed; their finitude revealed all too indifferently, all too 
late. Because of the distinctive relational composition of geographical imaginations, 
spun between nature and society, Hägerstrand proposed that a ‘central task for 
geography’ entailed teaching ‘the lessons of finitude’ (ibid. 334). The premise of 
Hägerstrand’s argument is that there is an intimate relation between finitude and a 
geographical ethics. However, Hägerstrand did not explore with any great precision 
what ‘finitude’ signifies, represents or communicates. This paper examines a series of 
historical and philosophical perspectives on finitude so as to both provide a more 
complex conceptualization of the term, and to help make the claim that finitude might 
be an important geographical notion. 
 
Geographers have recently begun to explore spatial and place-based accounts of death, 
dying and remembrance (Kong, 1999; Wylie, 2009; Rose, 2009; Herman, 2010). As 
Avril Maddrell and James Sidaway outline in their introduction to Deathscapes: Spaces 
for Death, Dying, Mourning and Remembrance, these geographical perspectives on 
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death are developing alongside extant literatures on geography, religion and the sacred; 
the politics of mourning and memorialisation; and nonrepresentational geographies of 
emotion and affect (2010: 2). In many ways, however, there continues to be little 
serious conceptual engagement with the notion of finitude since Hägerstrand’s call. This 
is problematic because, as this paper argues, one of the consequences of a critical 
exploration of finitude is the recognition that it plays an important, though often veiled, 
role within a series of geographical concepts and debates: from understandings of 
spatiality, corporeality and representation, to the ethics and politics that are made 
possible – or denied – through the boundaries inscribed between the human and the 
animal, the organic and the inorganic. A geographical encounter with the notion of 
finitude therefore extends beyond geo-anthropological accounts of the sacred, or 
religions perspectives on dying, identity and remembrance, towards historical and 
contemporary theorisations of the human, understandings of worldhood and spatiality, 
and, as Hägerstrand intimated, ethical geographies of the non-human.  
 
Another consequence of engaging with the notion of finitude is that it presents an 
epistemological and representational challenge. It is perhaps a symptom of the influence 
of Gilles Deleuze upon contemporary socio-spatial theory that death has remained a 
marginal concern even for nonrepresentational geography (but see Harrison, 2007; 
Wylie, 2007, 2009; Romanillos, 2008). Finitude, death and absence are not ‘presences’ 
phenomenologically at hand that can be simply documented, categorized and 
represented. Whether we are thinking of ecological destruction, the passing of a loved 
one, or the ignominious power of States to decide between life and death, thinking death 
cannot be an objective process. As the work of Georges Bataille demonstrates, this is 
because death is the limit of thought, and as this limit it contaminates and affects the 
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very project of knowledge that seeks to address it (see in particular Bataille, 1962: 11-
25, 1990). Hägerstrand hints at this epistemological problematic when he proposes that 
finitude is something intuitively grasped rather than categorically ‘known’. However, to 
what extent can we even propose to ‘grasp’ finitude? As Martin Heidegger puts it: 
‘death is in every case mine, in so far as it ‘is’ at all.’ (1962: 284). Similarly, Jean-Luc 
Nancy argues that ‘finitude itself is nothing; it is neither a ground, nor an essence, nor a 
substance. But it appears, it presents itself, it exposes itself…’ (1991: 28). Clearly, the 
distinctive phenomenality of finitude raises questions concerning representation and 
communication. Indeed, between authors such as Heidegger, Hegel and Blanchot, 
finitude comes to be thought as that which makes language possible: ‘language is the 
life that endures death and maintains itself in it.’ (Blanchot, 1995: 336). Similarly, 
Jacques Derrida notes that finitude structures the possibility – and exigency – for 
writing, representations and the archive: ‘There would indeed be no archive desire 
without the radical finitude, without the possibility of a forgetfulness which does not 
limit itself to repression.’ (1998: 19). Beyond these ontological claims concerning a co-
originarity of language and death, however, there is also the question of how death is 
written, represented and mediated. For example, to what extent does it require or 
demand a particular form of writing style or address? As the later work of Derrida on 
death, friendship and mourning demonstrates, language shatters and fragments under 
the exigency to communicate precisely that which – in the experience of death and loss 
– exceeds representational discursive economies (Derrida, 2000, 2003). 
 
These initial reflections on writing and representation raise the broader question of how 
to ‘relate’ to death and finitude? In his paper, Hägerstrand seems to claim that the 
geographical imagination is particularly adept at communicating finitude because of its 
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‘relational’ thinking and its capacity to bridge the natural and social worlds. But to what 
extent is the non-relationality of death and finitude adequately situated within the 
relational grammar of contemporary geographical discourse? For example, does not the 
history of Western philosophy, as Giorgio Agamben documents, take finitude and 
consciousness of death – alongside the capacity for the logos – to be an instance of the 
radical separation of the human from the natural; the site of an un-crossable abyss? 
Indeed, if death is a border or a limit (see Derrida, 1993), it is one that has traditionally 
been inscribed within the limits of the human. There is then an anthropocentric basis to 
the notion of finitude that demands to be recognised and deconstructed. As the 
following section demonstrates, this anthropocentrism insidiously insinuates itself into 
the very epistemological conditions of geographical representation. By turning to the 
work of Heidegger, Kant and Foucault, the section below unpacks how the 
anthropocentric basis of finitude acts as a subterranean conceptual pivot for existential 
analyses of being-in-the-world. By exploring this ‘existential analytic of finitude’, the 
analysis therefore arrives at the following crucial geographical consequence of engaging 
with finitude in the context of post-Heideggerian spatial theory: that the anthropocentric 
borders and divisions at work in the notion of finitude also problematically ground and 
striate phenomenological understandings of ‘spatiality’ itself.  
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Existential Analytic of Finitude 
In Perspective on the Nature of Geography, Richard Hartshorne presents an interesting 
and utterly bizarre thought experiment aimed at revealing something of the nature of 
geographical knowledge. ‘Let us suppose’, he writes,  
 
that the human race should use its recently discovered powers to destroy itself, 
and were ultimately succeeded by a race of literate insects who learned to read 
our books through minimizers. They could accept our physics and chemistry, 
and the greater part of other natural sciences with little change, but might find it 
necessary to completely rewrite the physical (not to mention the ‘human’) 
branches of geography (1964: 45).  
 
Hartshorne is attempting here to outline what is thematically ‘significant’ for the 
discipline of geography. The point he is making is that geographical significance is 
constituted in ‘terms of significance to man [sic]’ (ibid. 46), and that geographers 
necessarily conceive ‘of the earth as the world of man’ (ibid. 47). At various other 
points in the text Hartshorne extends this gendered and anthropocentric understanding 
of geography by describing the world as the dwelling-place or ‘home of man’, 
occasionally resorting to a teleological depiction of life that places the human at its 
summit. These are statements that are likely to be vigorously contested by current 
critical geographies concerned with both dismantling the gendered history of the 
discipline, and problematising hierarchical enumerations of life.  
 
And yet by enquiring into how we conceive of geographical knowledge and 
conceptualize ‘earth’, ‘home’, and ‘world’, Hartshorne is engaged in important 
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epistemological work precisely because he is underlining the phenomenological 
anthropocentricism of geographical thought. By framing geographical knowledge in 
terms of its relation-to-the-human, I want to argue, Hartshorne is presenting a kind of 
Kantian account of geography that foregrounds the specificity of the human as 
constitutive for the kinds of knowledges that are rendered possible and conceivable in 
the first instance. As the paper argues below, the ‘specificity’ that grounds this 
possibility for knowledge and world is constituted in post-Kantian thought in terms of 
the ‘radical finitude’ of the human subject.  
 
Now, let it be stressed here that by drawing upon Hartshorne’s thought experiment in 
this way I am not arguing for the validity of anthropocentric ways of thought. Rather, I 
am claiming that to understand anthropocentrism as an epistemological and 
phenomenological process, as much as a theological or ideological assumption, is to 
help challenge it more profoundly. What this means then is that anthropocentrism is not 
a doctrine or perspective to which one simply subscribes or rejects, but is rather bound 
up in much more complex ways with the very modes of representation through which 
we think the space of the world. Crucially, as I develop below, ‘finitude’ plays an 
important role both in crystallizing the image of thought implicit in anthropocentrism, 
and in shaping the ways in which it operates as an epistemological and 
phenomenological process. For these reasons, a deconstruction of the anthropocentric 
basis of finitude is important conceptual work, particularly in the context of developing 
understandings of non-human geographies and environmental ethics, precisely because 
it is so subterranean and bound up with habitual epistemologies and phenomenological 
languages (Meillassoux, 2008). To use an image from Heidegger’s (1959) Introduction 
9 
to Metaphysics, the figure of anthropocentricism is not a shadow of geographical history 
that can simply be jumped over.  
 
To help explore Hartshorne’s thought experiment in relation to this ‘radical finitude’ we 
can turn to Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1997). In his ‘Kantbook’ 
Heidegger provides a detailed reading of The Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 2008), 
exploring the work in the light his analysis of the history of metaphysics and the 
existential analytic of Dasein developed in Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962)
1
. Whilst 
there is not the space to go into much detail concerning this Kantbook, two points are 
worth outlining. Firstly, Heidegger proposes that Kant’s explication of the 
transcendental categories does not reflect a desire to uncover the working of pure 
reason; it ‘has nothing to do with a ‘theory of knowledge’’ (Heidegger, 1997: 11). The 
path that Heidegger takes in wresting Kant’s Critique from being understood as a 
‘theory of mathematical, natural-scientific knowledge’ (ibid. 191), is to read it in terms 
of an ‘analytic of finitude’ that is ontologically constitutive of knowledge. The finitude 
of knowledge is not revealed after the fact; when, for example, Hartshorne’s thought 
experiment concerning the end of the world is realised. To argue for the finitude of 
knowledge here is not simply to demonstrate the historicity of scientific discourse, or 
reveal the limits and borders of perception, sensation or reason, but to foreground 
finitude as the conditioning space for thought as such. 
 
This finitude of reason…in no way consists only or primarily in the fact that 
 human knowing demonstrates many sorts of deficiencies such as instability, 
                                                 
1
 The Kantbook occupies an important space in Heidegger’s philosophy, published between Being and 
Time, 1927, and the 1929/30 winter lectures of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Finitude, Solitude (Heidegger, 1995), discussed below. 
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 imprecision, and [the potential for making] errors. Rather, this finitude lies in 
 the essential structure of knowledge itself (Heidegger, 1997: 15).  
 
The second key point that I want to highlight from the Kantbook is intimately bound 
with the first: finitude does not just ground knowledge, it is also, and more primordially, 
grounds the specificity of the human for whom appearances, representations and 
knowledges become phenomenologically possible as such. Here we see how finitude 
comes to operate as a crucial site of anthropocentric distinction. It is also why we can 
read Hartshorne’s thought experiment in terms of an anthropocentrism that is 
epistemological: one is concerned here with representations possible through the 
fragmentary spacings of the human body, the finite temporalities of its existential 
trajectories, and the worldhood that is ‘proper’ to it alone. Turning again to Heidegger’s 
account of the Critique, Kant’s work on the conditions of possibility for knowledge, and 
the divisions between phenomena and noumena, is said to revolve around a hidden 
confrontation with the specific being of the human (Dasein). In short, while Kant seeks 
to metaphysically ‘ground’ reason by way of a thinking free from experience, 
Heidegger in turn grounds this very philosophical capacity ‘to ground’ in a prior 
existential and worldly analysis:  
 
The ground for the source for laying the ground for metaphysics is human pure 
reason, so that it is precisely the humanness of reason, i.e. its finitude, which 
will be essential for the core of this problematic of ground-laying (1997: 15 
emphasis added).  
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Stuart Elden has stressed the importance of the notion of ground for Heidegger’s 
account of Being and the spatiality of Dasein (Elden, 2002, 2005; cf. Malpas, 2007). As 
he puts it, “Heidegger was always concerned with the fundamental, the foundational, 
the grounding issues” (Elden, 2005: 823). But as Elden also reminds us, the ground at 
play in Heidegger’s writings – finitude – is not a ground at all, if by ground one 
understands something substantive, fathomable and calculable. Rather, the ground is 
also an abyss (abgrund), the ‘night is also a sun’ (Nietzsche, 2003: 331), and to think 
this abyssal experience is to reckon with “[a]n impossible encounter that makes possible 
what follows” (Elden, 2005: 824). Importantly for Heidegger, an experience of finitude 
both makes possible the receptivity and representation of the world, and specifies 
Dasein from other beings: ‘the animal is separated from man by an abyss’. (Heidegger, 
1995: 264). 
 
In these passages from the Kantbook, Heidegger is positioning ‘finitude’ as a 
conditioning and active force that structures both the possibility for reflection on the 
limits of reason and the historicity of ‘ontic’ knowledges, and as ontologically 
generative of the human itself. Alexandre Kojève argues that the legacy of Hegelian 
thought can be conceived in a similar way. In his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel 
(1980), for example, Kojève presents Hegel as an inaugural thinker of finitude. 
Crucially, and as found in the passages from Heidegger above, finitude and death in 
Hegel are bound up with the production of a boundary or limit between the human and 
the animal, history and nature. What an enquiry into the analytic history of finitude 
helps unpack then are some of the conceptual mechanisms and languages at work when 
divisions between culture and nature articulated. For Kojève, for example, whilst death 
is deemed to be a discontinuous end point for the animal, Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
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Spirit demonstrates how the negativity of death is interpolated into the very constitution 
of the human subject qua world-historical consciousness (cf. Butler, 1999; Nancy, 
2002).  
 
Whatever is confined within the limits of a natural life cannot by its own efforts 
go beyond its immediate existence; but it is driven beyond it by something else, 
and this uprooting entails its death. Consciousness, however, is explicitly the 
Notion of itself. Hence it is something that goes beyond limits, and since these 
limits are its own, it is something that goes beyond itself. (Hegel, 2004: 51).  
 
In Hegelian terms, the ‘work of the negative’ is formative for human self-consciousness 
precisely because consciousness needs to destroy and exceed its immediate limits and 
self-presence to be what it is. For Kojève, Hegel’s famous account of the ‘Master and 
Slave’ presents this dialectical process through a dramatization of the bloody birth of 
History in which the figure of the Master succeeds in a fight to the death for pure 
‘prestige’ and wins recognition from the vanquished Slave2. Inaugurating History, the 
Master desires and fights for something outside of the limits of their natural being (the 
‘prestige’ won is useless from the perspective of the preservation of their biological 
being), and it is this negation of immediate, natural presence that is said to constitute the 
essence of a ‘Historical’ rather than merely ‘Natural’ desire. As the anthropological 
Hegelianism of Kojève puts it, death is said to ‘humanize’ the biological entity homo 
sapiens (cf. Kojève, 1980: 3-30, 2007: 209-231).  
 
                                                 
2
 Think: ape-sequence, 2001: A Space Odyssey. 
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What the work of Heidegger and Kojève allows us to recognize then is that thinking 
about finitude is not to be taken as some morbid reaction, for example, to a set of vitalist 
life philosophies
3
. Rather it is about reflexively underlining finitude as 
phenomenologically constitutive of the human capacity to think the world as living, 
lugubrious, or anything at all. This is also to challenge understandings of finitude that 
consider it as little more than an exercise in mysticism. For Alain Badiou, for example, 
this mysticism is said to unfold from the central place given to the Holocaust in the 
ethical philosophies, or ‘anthropologies of finitude’ of authors such as Levinas, 
Blanchot, Derrida or Agamben (Badiou, in Hallward, 2004: 237). For Badiou, whilst 
death comes to be the central operator of their philosophies, it also withdraws from any 
philosophical apprehension because it is conceived in terms of a radical impossibility 
and passivity. It is this contradictory position concerning both the centrality, and a 
priori unknowability, of death that for Badiou is the hallmark of a ‘religious’ rather than 
a philosophical discourse (Badiou, 2002: 18-39).  
 
To unshackle existence down here from its mortal correlation requires that it 
should be axiomatically wrested from the phenomenological constitution of 
experience as well as from the Nietzschean naming of being as life. To think 
existence without ﬁnitude – that is the liberatory imperative, which extricates 
existence from the ultimate signiﬁer of its submission, death. (Badiou, 2009: 268 
emphasis in original). 
 
For Badiou, more important than any thinking of finitude as phenomenologically-
existentially constitutive (or as ethical force, socio-political relation, or epistemological 
                                                 
3
 For Deleuze, for instance, death is more or less a matter of indifference, while a philosophy that is 
preoccupied with death a sign of ‘reactive forces’ (Deleuze, 1986). Deleuze’s almost Stoic indifference is 
perhaps best expressed in interview: ‘It’s organisms that die, not life.’ (Deleuze, 1995: 143) 
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ground) is the possibility for philosophy to approach the Immortal: “Under what 
conditions is existence…that of an Immortal?” (ibid.; cf. Badiou, 2002: 10-16). In the 
context of this imperative, as he puts it in Logics of Worlds, “what comes to pass with 
death is an exterior change in the function of appearing of a given multiple. This change 
is always imposed upon the dying being, and this imposition is contingent.” (Badiou, 
2009: 270)
4. What this means is that death is not to be taken as a “category of being” 
(ibid. 269). Rather, it is understood as a category of “appearance”, as an exterior 
modification of a given multiple. By making this distinction, Badiou makes the case 
that a thinking of existence in terms of its “mortal correlation”, or what Quentin 
Meillassoux in After Finitude has recently termed the “phenomenological correlate” 
(2008), is philosophically problematic. The basic claim here is that death must neither 
contaminate (mathematical) ontology, nor obfuscate the reality, production, and 
affirmation of singular, eternal truths.  
 
Whilst Badiou’s lamentations have the value of underlining the anthropocentric or 
humanist basis to finitude, they are, however, more revealing of the conceptual logic of 
Badiou’s thought than they are interventions into how finitude is addressed, experienced 
and existentially constitutive. The attempt to exclude or repress finitude for 
‘ontological’ reasons, is to veil how finitude emerges as a historical problematic 
concerning the conceptualization of life. For example, in Heidegger’s terms it “possess 
the methodological function of revealing the apparent positivity in the problem of life.” 
(1995: 266). This relation between finitude and the historicity of knowledge is deployed 
                                                 
4
 In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze offers a similar account of death as an ‘external’ (1988: 41) 
‘decomposition’ of the modes and relations (affects) of the body (i.e. a modification of the body as a 
given multiple). In death, a body’s mode of expression and relations are decomposed: ‘this occurs when 
the relation, which is itself an eternal truth, is no longer realized by actual parts. What has been done 
away with is not the relation, which is eternally true, but rather the parts between which it was established 
and which have now assumed another relation.’ (ibid. 32, see also pages 41-2, 62-3, 95).  
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in Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things where he provides a more empirical account 
of this ‘analytic of finitude’ (Foucault, 2000: 315). In his study of the development of 
the human and life sciences, Foucault explores the modern constitution of ‘man’ as an 
entity that emerges historically both as an empirical object of positive knowledge, and 
as transcendental subject that provides the conditions of possibility for those 
knowledges (ibid. 322). This division of the human as both object and subject of 
knowledge is described by Foucault precisely in terms of an analytic of finitude: ‘Man’s 
[sic] finitude is heralded…in the positivity of knowledge; we know that man is finite, as 
we know the anatomy of the brain, the mechanics of production costs…’ (ibid. 313). At 
the same time, Foucault stresses that ‘each of these positive forms in which man can 
learn that he is finite is given to him only against the background of its own finitude’ 
(ibid. 314). Recalling Heidegger’s reflections on Kantian conditions, finitude is thought 
here as ‘that upon the basis of which it is possible for positivity to arise’ (ibid.; cf. 
Harvey, 2007).  
 
At this point it is worth stressing that between thinkers as diverse as Heidegger, Kojève 
and Foucault the word ‘finitude’ is employed in epistemological and ontological 
registers almost simultaneously. It is also for the most part posited in what could 
legitimately be described as a ‘metaphysical’ language; presented as a vague and 
imprecise generative ‘ground’. However, and departing from the conclusions offered by 
Badiou, for Derrida, rather than a sign of faulty philosophical logic, this imprecision 
should be recognised as a legitimate response to finitude, precisely because finitude 
exceeds and resists conceptual capture. In Archive Fever, for instance, Derrida reflects 
on the difficulty of thinking the archive in relation to the anarchic force of the death 
drive: 
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We have no concept, only an impression, a series of impressions associated with 
a word. To the rigor of the concept, I am opposing here the vagueness or the 
open imprecision, the relative indetermination of such a notion. (Derrida, 1998: 
29)
5
 
 
Despite its various modalities of indetermination, however, what is specific about 
finitude is that it has operated as an anthropocentric division. For example, while 
Foucault extends Heidegger’s critique of ‘cultural anthropologies’ used as a framework 
for understanding the human subject (see in particular Heidegger, 1993), and despite 
rejecting the ahistorical transcendentalism of Kant, Foucault nevertheless repeats 
Heidegger’s gesture of taking this analytic of finitude to be an instance of the radical 
separation of human from animal. Recalling the language of Hegel’s Phenomenology, 
Foucault claims that the capacities for knowledge and self-reflection are ‘imbued with 
finitude’, and, that they would not be possible if ‘man…was trapped in the mute, 
nocturnal, immediate and happy opening of animal life’ (Foucault, 2000: 314). As the 
work of Agamben demonstrates, both Heidegger and Foucault reveal finitude to be a 
crucially important figure in the reproduction of the ‘anthropological machine’ – that 
process in which the animal, animality and non-human are posited as vehicles for 
distinguishing the human (Agamben, 2004). As the discussion of Heidegger and 
Foucault has outlined, this is even the case in those discourses that explicitly claim to 
exceed and deconstruct inherited metaphysical, theological and anthropological 
conceptions of the human subject.  
 
                                                 
5
 It is for these methodological reasons that throughout this paper I prefer to talk about a notion, rather 
than a concept, of finitude (cf. Bataille, ‘The Notion of Expenditure’, in Visions of Excess, 1985: 116- 
129). 
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The consequence for geographers interested in spatial theory in a post-Heideggerian 
context is that this analytic of finitude – and the anthropocentric borders and limits it 
inscribes – is intimately bound up with Heideggerian accounts of ‘spatiality’. The 
following section develops these ideas by examining how the notion of finitude plays a 
crucial, though concealed, role in Heidegger’s account of spatiality.  
 
 
Death-based Spatiality  
In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant famously postulates a series of a priori 
transcendental conditions necessary for phenomenological apprehension to take place. 
Space, conceived in this way, is thought as a ‘ground’ for all intuitions and 
representations (Kant, 2008: 157-162). As Heidegger elaborates,  
 
space must already be apparent prior to any taking in of what is at hand… It 
[space] must be represented as that ‘within which’ what is at hand can first be 
encountered: Space is [something] represented which is necessary, and 
necessary in advance, in finite human knowing (1997: 32).  
 
As outlined above, Heidegger argues that this thinking of space as a transcendental 
condition of possibility demands to be thought within a more primordial existential 
ground that takes into account the specific kind of being, worldhood and spatiality of 
Dasein. As he puts it in Being and Time: ‘If we attribute spatiality to Dasein, then this 
‘Being in space’, must manifestly be conceived in terms of the kind of Being which that 
entity possesses’ (Heidegger, 1962: 138). In other words, to understand ‘spatiality’ is to 
understand the ontological nature of the entity said to have, or experience, spatiality.  To 
18 
be violently brief to Heidegger’s work, in Being and Time it is Dasein’s being-towards-
death that is presented as the existential horizon that primordially distinguishes the 
specific ‘Being’ of Dasein, and which thereby ecstatically opens the space and time of a 
world.  Not only does an experience of finitude differentiate the kind of Being of Dasein 
from other entities as beings-in-space, it is also productive of the individuated 
distinctions between self and Other. Death is conceived in terms of presenting an 
authentic subjectivity, and of tracing the most proper and territory of the self.  
 
The non-relational character of death, understood in anticipation, individualizes 
Dasein down to itself. (Heidegger, 1962: 308 emphasis added).  
 
In a chapter entitled ‘Death-based subjectivity’ Jonathan Strauss provides an account of 
Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein that allows it to be seen as a historically 
‘modern’ sense of subjectivity. More specifically, it’s modernity, Strauss claims, lies in 
the way in which the individual becomes constituted in relation to an experience of 
finitude (1998: 23-73). For Strauss, the historical horizon for this understanding, shared 
between post-Kantian thinkers such as Heidegger, Hegel and Kojève, can be traced 
genealogically to the specific form of death produced by the French Revolution: the 
guillotine. In particular, Strauss reflects on how the political context of the Terror led 
various ‘modern’ philosophers to place an unwarranted emphasis on death as a way to 
think about the self. For Strauss, this has resulted in philosophical accounts of the self 
that privilege an ‘authentic subjectivity’ grounded in the appropriate ‘moods’ of terror 
and violent anguish before death (cf. Adorno, 1973: 130-165)
6
. The consequence of 
                                                 
6
 If, as Strauss claims, the privileging in post-Kantian philosophy of the affects of anguish and anxiety 
before death is historically bound to the Terror, perhaps a similar claim can be made for writings on death 
in the twentieth century. Specifically, the writings on mourning, repetition, grief, disaster and trauma by 
Freud (1991), Levinas (2001), Bataille (1991), and Blanchot (1986), often appear as a response to the 
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these historical reflections, as the anthropological historian Philippe Ariès has also 
argued, is that the notion of death as a violent, anxiety-provoking and excessive limit 
cannot claim a transcendent historical status (1977, 1981; cf. Dollimore, 1998; Strauss, 
2000). As Ariès claims with reference to pre-modern cultural practices and 
representations of death: 
 
The idea of an absolute negativity, a sudden, irrevocable plunge into an abyss 
without memory, did not exist. Nor did people experience an existential 
disorientation or anxiety, at least these did not figure in the stereotypical images 
of death. (Ariès 1981: 22) 
 
Broadly speaking, for Ariès the philosophically ‘modern’ accounts of death found in 
authors like Pascal, Schopenhauer or Kierkegaard do not account for the overwhelming 
ubiquity and familiarity of death in medieval and early modern periods. In particular, 
they do not account for how death was experienced as a public and fundamentally social 
phenomena. For example, in France ‘until the end of the nineteenth century’ Ariès 
claims that ‘the dying person must be the centre of a group of people’ (ibid. 18). 
Similarly, Ariès stresses that in both early modern France and England, ‘the cemetery 
was the public square, in a time when there were no other public places except the 
street’ (ibid. 65)7. At the same time, the philosophically ‘modern’ conceptions of death 
                                                                                                                                               
profound impact of the First and Second World Wars, and specifically of the Holocaust. For a series of 
important geographical examinations of the spatial logic, political rationalities and biopolitics of the 
Holocaust see: Clarke et al., 1996; Abrahamsson C, 2008; Carter-White, 2009; Giaccaria and Minca, 
2010. 
7
 Ariès offers an interesting speculation in this context concerning the role of cemeteries in providing the 
model for the ‘public square’ as a forum surrounded by a variety of shops (the Plaza Mayor in Spain, the 
Place des Voges and the Palais-Royal in Paris). At least in Spain, the central town plaza certainly had an 
important public and festive relation to death, often acting as the site for bullfights from the late 18
th
 
century until bullfighting became a professional and independent institution in the 1830s and 1840s (see: 
Mitchell, 1986; Shubert, 1999). 
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do not adequately account for the way in which death was often represented as a ‘fall 
into sleep’, characteristic of what Ariès describes as ‘tame deaths’ (Ariès, 1977)8. 
 
While this historical and cultural anthropology fails, as Derrida argues in Aporias 
(1993: 25-28), to determine or explain away the ontological and existential thinking at 
work in Heidegger’s analytic of finitude, it does have the value of underlining the ways 
in which Heidegger’s analytic operates within a political and historical language of 
authenticity and individualization. The point I want to develop here is that this 
‘individualizing’ force of finitude is precisely at work in his account of spatiality, world 
and worldhood. Further, that it is between a death-based subjectivity and a death-based 
spatiality that the notion of finitude can be seen as a powerful agent in constructing 
anthropocentric perspectives.  
 
As Agamben agues in The Open: Man and Animal, the boundary-drawing and propriety 
of Heidegger’s analysis is most clearly presented in the lecture series The Fundamental 
Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. In this text, Heidegger proposes to 
enquire into the concepts of world, finitude and individuation (solitude). As is befitting 
the ‘open imprecision’ and ‘indetermination’ of the notion, finitude itself is not explored 
with the same conceptual depth and detail as ‘world’, for example (see Stambaugh, 
1992). Nonetheless, Heidegger stresses that in relation to the concepts of world and 
individuation, finitude is to be taken ‘as the unifying and original root of the other two’ 
(Heidegger, 1995: 170 emphasis in original).  
                                                 
8
 The work of Ariès opens onto some interesting arenas of possible research concerning the historical and 
cultural geographies of the practices, representations and spatialities of death. Indeed, there are already 
some useful works in these areas, from geographical analyses of more ‘modern’ cemeteries as 
deathscapes, sites of class distinction, biopolitical governance (see, respectively Kong, 1999; Herman, 
2010; Johnson, 2008), to studies on the spaces of memorialisation, trauma, heritage and identity (Gough, 
2008; Ashworth, 2008; Madrell & Sidaway, 2010). 
21 
 
In order to account for the specificity of Dasein’s worldhood Heidegger contrasts 
Dasein with animals and non-organic entities, such as stones. Famously, he arrives at 
the following theses: ‘the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is world-
forming’ (Heidegger, 1995: 176). Drawing in part upon contemporary biological 
science and the ethological work of Jakob von Uexküll, Heidegger explores what he 
terms the ‘animality’ of the animal as a way of understanding if it could be said to have, 
or not have, a ‘world’. Heidegger comes to think of the animal in terms of its captivated 
behaviour within an environment.  
 
Captivation is the condition of possibility for the fact that…the animal behaves 
within an environment but never [comports itself] within a world. (Heidegger, 
1995: 239).  
 
For Heidegger, the animal is ‘taken’ by its environment. Indeed, it is essentially 
encircled with(in) its environment in such a way that this encirclement constitutes its 
very ‘animality’. However, whilst the animal is instinctively and affectively open to its 
environment, Heidegger argues that it is deprived of phenomenological access to the 
world as world, and other entities as entities. It is because of this absence that it is said 
to be ‘poor in world’. This poverty relates to the animal’s apparent inability to grasp the 
‘world’ as such, and as a whole. This notion of the animal as ‘poor in world’ has been 
critically explored by human geographers interested in debates about the spatialities of 
affect and ethological accounts of bodies (Thrift, 2004, 2005; Ash, 2010). The 
appropriateness of the distinction is also a fundamental question in post-Heideggerian 
debates (Derrida, 1991: 23-30, 1993, 2002; Agamben, 2004; Calarco, 2008; Esposito, 
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2008). However, what has been less well explored is how the animal’s ‘poverty in 
world’ is also grounded upon two other modalities of ‘poverty’ which, Heidegger 
claims, are intimately related; namely, an inability to experience a relation to death as 
such, and to relate this experience through the logos.  
 
Mortals are they who can experience death as death. Animals cannot do so. But 
animals cannot speak either. The essential relation between death and language 
flashes up before us, but remains still unthought. (Heidegger, cited in Agamben, 
1991: xi). 
 
Just as animal and Dasein are granted different worlds and spatialities, so Heidegger 
also radically distinguishes between the kinds of ‘death’ possible for these beings. 
While the animal is immanently and constitutively encircled by its ‘disinhibiting ring’ 
and can be said to possess an environment without thereby ‘having world’, so for 
Heidegger the animal can perish without thereby ‘dying’ (see Heidegger, 1962: 290-
293; cf. Derrida, 1993: 30-42). As Heidegger summarily puts it: “Because captivation 
belongs to the essence of the animal, the animal cannot die in the sense in which dying 
is ascribed to human beings but can only come to an end.” (1995: 267). Through this 
logic of propriety Heidegger arguably puts into question the validity of the ethical 
principle inaugurated by Bentham concerning the suffering of the animal as the 
condition for ethical response. For if the animal cannot die in the sense in which it is 
ascribed to human beings, to what extent are other forms-of-life and bodily experience 
also excluded, and with what consequences? As the following sections unfold, what is 
at stake here concerns the way in which finitude insinuates itself in the borders and 
limits of ethics. As the paper also goes on to argue below, the importance of thinking 
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finitude geographically in this context, and after Hägerstrand’s call, is precisely to 
trouble the logic of these borders. 
  
 
 
Finitude as an Ethical Topology 
Alongside the anthropocentric distinctions concerning spatiality and finitude discussed 
above, one can find subtended in Heidegger’s text a broader conceptual division 
inscribed between the organic and the inorganic. As Heidegger argues in The 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, only organic organisms can be said to end, 
perish or die. Heidegger summarizes what follows from this position in the following 
way: ‘‘dead matter’ is a meaningless concept’ (1995: 236). This statement is incredibly 
revealing of Heidegger’s post-Kantian heritage and the way in which the exceptionalism 
of human life is rendered sacrosanct precisely insofar as it is distanced from natural, 
inorganic ‘matter’, and from scientistic conceptions of causality. In these latter aspects, 
Heidegger’s distribution of finitude corresponds to certain vitalist writings’ distribution 
of ‘spirit’ or élan vital (see Greenhough, 2010). More importantly, however, is that it is 
also a provocative statement for thinking about the kinds of politics and ethics that 
various forms of new materialism are seeking to create, and the philosophical histories 
that are being challenged and reworked in these projects (see for example: Bingham, 
2006; Stoekl, 2007; Hinchliffe & Bingham, 2008; Bennett, 2010; Greenhough, 2010). 
This is because Heidegger’s statement raises profound questions concerning the 
anthropocentric limits of ethical geographies of the non-human, care and responsibility. 
First amongst these questions is the following: how is one to respond to deaths that are 
not – philosophically, legally, politically – counted as deaths? How are we to ethically 
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respond to such phenomena as environmental disaster, catastrophe or extinction? The 
problem here is that the powerful legacy of Heideggerian thought has shaped the sense 
of an ethical response in terms of an anthropocentric finitude. For Heidegger, for 
example, ‘Being-towards-death is grounded in care’ (1962: 303). Whilst in many ways 
critical of Heidegger’s philosophy, the work of Levinas also underscores the place of 
finitude in ethics and responsibility: ‘I am responsible for the other insofar as he is 
mortal.’ (Levinas, cited in Derrida, 1993: 39). The very notion of an ethical relation 
appears to be predicated upon an Other who is ‘counted’ as having the right to be 
treated responsibly on account of the kind of finitude they are said to possess. 
 
Drawing precisely upon this heritage, Mustafa Dikeç, Nigel Clarke and Clive Barnett 
have recently proposed that ‘human finitude’ is conditioning and generative of the 
ethical spatio-temporalities of hospitality (Dikeç et al, 2009; cf. Popke, 2007). For the 
authors, the writings of Levinas and Derrida are central to their account of ‘human 
finitude’ for the most part conceived as ‘corporeal vulnerability’; the shared exposure of 
bodily limits that appears as the condition of possibility for normative praxis.  
 
Hospitality turns on a vital receptivity to the needs of an Other, but so too are 
these needs bound up with the constitutive openness and vulnerability of the 
living body. (Dikeç et al., 2009: 11).  
 
What this work helps underline, again, is the importance of finitude in shaping ethical 
geographies. Clearly, these authors are drawing upon accounts of finitude to consider 
forms of hospitality in specific socio-political contexts. They are aware of the central 
place of limits, borders and thresholds in both Levinas and Derrida’s thinking of ethics, 
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hospitality and the Other. However, their work raises the interesting question of 
whether, and how far, notions of normative responsibility and ethical relations as such 
can be prised apart from a finitude inscribed within the borders of the human subject. 
Posing this question is to recognise how the intimate relation between anthropocentrism 
and finitude presents itself as a complex ethico-topological demarcation, with 
consequences for how ethical relations are conceived and practiced.  
 
 
Anthropocentrism / Anthropomorphism 
What is the Heideggerian response to the explicit charge of anthropocentrism? For 
instance, does not the conceptual trinity of world, finitude and Dasein, alongside the 
language of limits and borders elevate the human above other forms of life such as 
animals said to be ‘poor in world’, and matter that can not even qualify as ‘dead’? As 
Derrida argues, Heidegger’s delimitation of the animal in terms of ‘privative 
poverty…cannot avoid a certain anthropocentric or even humanist ideology.’ (Derrida, 
1991: 55)
9
. Perhaps the most interesting responses to these charges can be found in 
Heidegger’s reflections on animals and animality. For Heidegger, the distinctions 
between the deaths and worlds of Dasein and animal are necessary because it is 
conceptually illegitimate – a ‘groundless anthropomorphization’ (Heidegger, cited in 
Agamben, 2004: 59) – to think of the animal within the same existential spatio-temporal 
horizon as Dasein. Correspondingly, for Heidegger one must guard against observing 
and thinking the animal from human perspectives (such as experiencing moods 
concerning death, having ‘forms’ of language etc.) precisely because it does not address 
the specific animality of the animal. It is not faithful enough, as it were, to the Otherness 
                                                 
9
 As Derrida points out in The Ends of Man: ‘We can see then that Dasein, though not man [conceived 
anthropologically, biologically or theologically], is nevertheless nothing other than man.’ (1984: 127). 
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of the animal. To the charge of anthropocentrism, then, Heidegger responds by showing 
that at least he his not anthropomorphic.  
 
Heidegger’s critique of anthropomorphism also provides an interesting perspective on 
certain biological understandings of the ‘spatiality’ of the animal. This is particularly 
the case with his critique of the term ‘adaptation’ (1995: 263, 276-279). Here, he argues 
that the Darwinist discourse of adaptation does not adequately describe the specific 
‘animality’ of the animal as a living, essentially open potentiality. For example, he takes 
issue with how the term ‘adaptation’ appears to posit a distinct entity – the animal – as 
it were confronting an environment and subsequently acting to adapt itself: “The 
organism is not something independent in its own right which then adapts itself.” 
(Heidegger, 1995: 264). This image is problematic for Heidegger both because of its 
anthropomorphic projection of intentionality upon the animal, and because it veils the 
essential and constitutive spacing of the animal outside itself (see Agamben, 2004: 57-
62). In other words, Heidegger troubles the assumed boundary between the limits of the 
organism and its ‘environment’ – albeit within the context of his wider discourse on 
limits, borders and the contours of organic life and death (Derrida, 1993: 28-31). 
 
In The Open, Agamben points out that the intimacy of this environmental encirclement 
– the way in which one cannot properly think a given animal without immediately 
positing its specific openness-to and relations-with particular environmental affects and 
impulses
10
 – is structurally analogous to the way in which Heidegger posits Dasein as 
always already and essentially world-forming (Heidegger, 1995: 285). In pointing out 
                                                 
10
 Think for example of the mediums of air, water, or even sulphuric acid in the case of Ferroplasma 
acidiphilum, as necessary environments for particular organisms. In his lectures series, Heidegger 
concentrates for the most part on insects such as bees and tics, leaving primates and what he calls the 
‘higher animals’ to one side (Heidegger, 1995: 240-241). 
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this connection Agamben questions the apparently categorical separations inscribed by 
Heidegger between the spatialities of animal and Dasein. At the same time, it also 
provides a historical and political perspective upon Heidegger’s philosophy more 
broadly. In particular, for Agamben, it is a thought situated in the context of the early 
twentieth century in which the phenomenon of life is reconfigured spatially as 
organically grounded and bound to the particular characteristics of its ‘environment’. 
Heidegger’s existential spatiality and account of being-in-the-world, Agamben implies, 
can be thought in terms of this spatialisation of life, one that can no longer posit entities 
(such as an organism, Dasein, or a State) as authentically thinkable outside their 
material-spatial extension (see Agamben, 2004: 39-43). Agamben’s point is that this 
radical rethinking of the relations between organism and world is the precise conceptual 
horizon within which the racist geopolitical discourses of National Socialism developed. 
This is sketched too briefly by Agamben through referencing the work of Paul Vidal de 
la Blache ‘on the relations between populations and their environment’, and the 
Lebensraum of Friedrich Ratzel (ibid. 42). However, the broader conceptual claim here 
for geographical research interested in the relation between Heidegger’s spatial theory 
and politics is that it is not Heidegger’s romantic, idyllic and reactionary depictions of 
pastoral dwellings that signal his problematic political affiliations (Cloke & Jones, 
2002; cf. Wolin, 2001). Rather it is that the very relational spatialities that he expresses 
in his analyses of Dasein/world and animal/environment form the horizon within which 
Heidegger problematically develops his discourse of the rootedness and authenticity of 
philosophizing, of historical consciousness and of a politics inseparable from the ground 
of the nation.  
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However, as Derrida points out in Of Spirit, while the above analysis offers a 
comforting, rational narrative within which to contain Heidegger’s thought, it 
nonetheless runs the risk of not reading Heidegger carefully enough. Indeed, it is 
important not to naively posit some historico-conceptual continuum between 
Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world and early twentieth century discourses of 
human geography, demography, theories of race, or ethology. This is because 
Heidegger’s existential spatiality is based upon a radical destruction of metaphysics, 
one that is critically distanced from, among other things, ‘all biologism and even all 
philosophy of life (and thus from all political ideology which might draw its inspiration 
more or less from them)’ (Derrida, 1991: 54). As Derrida intimates, the difficulty of 
engaging with Heidegger’s spatial theory lies in the way his writing escapes disciplinary 
and political positioning; an evasion that makes any simple dismissal or celebration of 
his work problematic. 
 
The sections above have presented the Heideggerian understanding of spatiality as 
intimately bound up with a thinking of finitude. Further, they have underlined the 
anthropocentric borders and delimitations through which this thinking operates. This 
has not been to resolve debates concerning how the difference between human and 
animal is thought, or to question the legitimacy of even thinking and representing this 
‘difference’. Rather, it has been to unpack some of the conceptual histories woven 
through Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-world, and to open up some fundamental 
questions for growing research on geographical ethics, both human and non-human. In 
so doing, it has supplemented extant geographical accounts of Heidegger’s spatial 
theory by underscoring the importance of thinking death and finitude in this context. By 
way of a conclusion to this section I want to draw attention to two important 
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consequences of, or trajectories from, Heidegger’s account of spatiality – an account 
that, though I have questioned it, I consider to be a non-eliminable conceptual basis for 
thinking about world, finitude and spatiality. 
 
Firstly, it seems that both an understanding of spatiality and finitude need to be 
submitted to a critical deconstruction such that they can by approached outside of a 
singular authentic ground, and beyond a language of authenticity and individuality. A 
second and related consequence concerns the geographical imaginaries and spatialities 
through which we can attend to the non-human, both organic and inorganic. If we 
briefly recall Hägerstrand’s wish for geography to ‘teach the lessons of finitude’, and if 
we consider this in the context of Heidegger’s writings as a necessary conceptual basis 
for thinking about spatiality, world and death, then it seems as if Hägerstrand’s call to 
geographically grasp the finitude of ecological relations cannot work itself out unless 
finitude is extended beyond the anthropocentric boundaries that have been consistently 
bound up with the concept.  
 
In the final section of the paper, this attempt to think finitude ‘geographically’ is 
explored in two ways. Firstly, by drawing on the work of Georges Bataille to think 
through finitude as a shared corporeal exposure across the surface of the earth – a 
spacing that critically challenges the propriety and partitioning of Heidegger’s 
‘grounding’ of spatiality and finitude in terms of an authentic and anthropocentric 
individuality. Secondly, by thinking through how this shared corporeal exposure might 
be written in terms of ‘compassion’ – a concept developed by Jean-Luc Nancy to think 
about how finitude is shared and spaced between singularities rather than a property of 
subjects.  
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Corporeality and Compassion 
 
…our frenzy to persist in our present state – that’s the unconscionable torture… 
This body of ours, this disguise put on by common jumping molecules, is in 
constant revolt against the abominable farce of having to endure. Our molecules, 
the dears, want to get lost in the universe as fast as they can! It makes them 
miserable to be nothing but ‘us’, the jerks of infinity. (Céline, 2004: 299). 
 
In The Order of Things, Foucault claims that ‘finitude’ is inscribed and exposed ‘by the 
spatiality of the body, the yawning of desire, and the time of language’ (Foucault, 2000: 
315). What does it mean for finitude to be exposed by the spatiality of a body? A way 
into this question can be found in the corporeal image Heidegger often deploys to think 
about a relation to death ‘as such’. For Heidegger, an authentic relation to death is found 
in the figure of Dasein standing resolutely, and in anxious anticipation, in the face of 
death (Heidegger, 1962: 296-311; cf. Adorno, 1973: 136-139). Whilst it would be too 
easy to point to a kind of masculinity underwriting this image, Heidegger’s corporeal 
account of finitude seems to posit a subject that incorporates and conquers the 
negativity of death. 
 
Perhaps the most important, though neglected, challenge to this masculine sense of 
finitude can be found in the work of Georges Bataille. In his key texts Inner Experience 
and On Nietzsche he argues against the notion of anxiety as an authentic relation to 
death. For Bataille, the notion of anxiety or anguish before death, rather than an 
originary mood, is itself an effect or product of the desire for self-preservation (1988: 
31 
52-3; 1992: 146-147). In other words, ‘anxiety’ reveals itself to be an existential mood 
appropriate to an incorporation by the self. Against this security and boundedness, 
Bataille argues that this does not approach the excessive and ‘absolute dismemberment’ 
of death through which the subject is annihilated. As he claims in the essay ‘Hegel, 
Death and Sacrifice’ death can in no way be dialectically appropriated by the subject, as 
is implied at least in part by Heidegger’s figure of a being standing authentically, 
resolutely and intact before death (cf. Comay, 1990). Rather for Bataille death is 
precisely that which exceeds and wounds the limits of the subject, contaminating and 
eroding the possibility of a stable relation or experience (Bataille, 1990). Indeed, if there 
is an ‘experience of finitude’ in Bataille’s writing, then as Patrick ffrench argues, it is 
one that challenges and exceeds the phenomenological account of experience as a 
property of the subject: “In its exhaustion experience dissolves the subject ‘of’ 
experience.” (2007: 115). 
 
For these reasons Bataille’s writing is littered with dramatizations of corporeal finitude 
such as the tortured body of Christ; the work of butchers; the pollulation of insects; 
anthropological accounts of animal sacrifice; the bullfight; or the passivity of the 
sleeping figure (cf. Harrison, 2007, 2009). For Bataille, finitude is rendered visible 
through the body’s very vulnerability. But the condition of this vulnerability, which 
distinguishes it from the surmounted vulnerability of Heidegger’s resolute Dasein, is 
that the body is constitutively spaced-outside-itself rather than authentically grounded 
and rooted. Bataille’s writing reveals how the body is always already communicative 
through an ecstatic opening to the outside; exposed to energies that course through it 
and which constitutively exceed its limits. As presented in his earlier texts collected in 
Visions of Excess (Bataille, 1985), the body escapes out of itself through spasms of 
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energy, laughter, tears, urine, screaming, text, semen, blood, dead cells and cancerous 
growths. These visceral and excessive aspects of the body reveal the finitude of 
corporeality. Further, as I read Bataille, these excessive aspects of the body describe a 
spacing-outside-of-self that is the very ‘condition’ for a body at all. As Jean-Luc Nancy 
argues in The Inoperative Community, Bataille dramatizes an experience of finitude 
according to a spatial imaginary which, for Nancy, provides a way of conceptualizing a 
“modern experience of community as neither a work to be produced, nor a lost 
communion, but rather as space itself, and the spacing of the experience of the outside, 
of the outside-of-self” (1991: 19). 
 
In perhaps his most self-evidently geographical text, The Accursed Share: An Essay on 
General Economy vol. 1 Consumption, Bataille presents an image of the world in which 
the familiar separations of nature and culture are set aside for the purpose of revealing 
the shared finitude animating the surface of the earth; from bodies to plants, and from 
social institutions to animals. The book is described by Bataille himself in terms of a 
“Copernican transformation…of ethics” (Bataille, 1989: 25). However, unlike Kant’s 
“Copernican revolution” which re-centralizes the human subject by making objects and 
their movement conform to (human) knowledge, Bataille attempts to de-centralize and 
un-ground the human from its autonomy, propriety and idealism. As Nigel Clark has 
recently put it, Bataille’s ‘energetic geophysics’, in which finite beings on earth are 
radically exposed to a solar economy, gestures ‘towards an expansive sense of the earth 
and cosmos as the volatile ground of human and other creaturely life’ (Clark, 2011: 23). 
By writing on the violent agitations animating the earth from the perspective of a solar 
exuberance, Bataille also troubles how the borders between inorganic matter and 
organic ‘life’ are articulated.  
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While Bataille is not immune from Agamben’s analysis concerning the ‘anthropological 
machine’, and while he does not offer an unproblematic access to thinking beyond 
anthropocentric borders, his writings do provide a way of exploring how spatiality and 
finitude might be re-worked into a questioning of the human-centred appropriations of 
the earth as the ‘home of man’. To re-read Hägerstrand’s call for geographers to ‘teach 
the lessons of finitude’ in the light of Bataille’s writings is not solely to reveal the finite 
limits to resources and ecological relations. For the problem here would concern the 
extent to which this finitude is fundamentally determined according to its utility and 
value for human projects (see, for example Stoekl, 2007). Rather, it is to embark on a 
geographical writing of finitude that, as Clark also outlines in Inhuman Nature, is to 
radically un-ground the spatial imaginaries through which the earth, nature and 
phenomenality are conceptualised (see Clark, 2011: 16-22). Again, what is interesting 
about the work of authors such as Bataille and Nancy from a geographical point of view 
here is that the critiques of Heideggerian orthodoxies, by exploring the senses of 
communication, community, sharing and Mitsein, explicitly take place through 
experimental writings on the senses of spatiality and finitude (see in particular: Nancy, 
1992, 2000).  
 
For example, one of Nancy’s most important philosophical manoeuvres is to unbind the 
notion of finitude from the Heideggerian borders and spatiality of Dasein (see Nancy, 
1991, 1992, 2008). Drawing in part upon Bataille’s writings on finitude that stress its 
role as an ontologically shared passage or event of ‘communication’ through which 
singularities are constituted, Nancy presents a spatiality of Mitsein that affirms how, 
rather than appearing ‘for’ a subject to appropriate as its self-enclosed possibility or 
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experience, finitude can only “co-appear” (Nancy, 1991: 28); shared between and 
through the irreducible plurality of the world. 
 
Communication consists before all else in this sharing and in this compearance 
(com-parution) of finitude: that is, on the dislocation and in the interpellation 
that reveal themselves to be constitutive of being-in-common… (ibid. 29) 
 
In Being Singular Plural Nancy develops this sharing of finitude in terms of an 
experience of compassion. Distancing this notion from conceptions of charity or 
humanist pity, compassion for Nancy comes to signify the very experience of being in a 
world of finite singularities; a voice, a heart, a stone, a bumblebee, a biome. Through 
the very repetitions and monotony of Nancy’s pronouncements on the plurality of 
being-with, analogous perhaps to the intense repetitive insanity of Graham Harman’s 
lists of objects (2009), we are presented with a kind of worldly catechism. 
 
Com-passion is the contagion, the contact of being with one another in this 
turmoil. Compassion is not altruism, nor is it identification; it is the disturbance 
of violent relatedness. (Nancy, 2000: xiii) 
 
At the same time, because this writing is explicitly engaged in a critique or 
détournement of Heideggerian philosophy, it is a writing that is conscious of both the 
demand to, and the difficulty of, decentring and displacing this worldhood from the 
boundaries of Dasein. The creative and experimental writing to be found with Nancy is 
perhaps a response to this difficulty. Again, at this juncture it is worth repeating that, 
like Bataille, Nancy’s writings do not offer an easy or unproblematic response to 
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concerns over the inheritance of humanist or anthropocentric imaginaries, not least 
because of its grounding in large parts of Heidegger’s philosophy. However, it is 
another important example of how the relation between finitude and spatiality is the site 
of experimentations in order to think the spacings and matterings of the world 
differently. In the context of the broader claims of this paper, it also helps in the task of 
deconstructing how finitude has historically been problematically mapped, partitioned 
and distributed. 
 
 
 Conclusion: the writing of finitude 
 
Adam’s first act, which made him master of the animals, was to give them 
names, that is, he annihilated them in their existence (as existing creatures). 
(Hegel, cited in Blanchot, 1995: 323). 
 
The bear could speak if he wanted, but he prefers not to…  
(Lot-Falck, cited in Bataille, 2005: 163) 
 
As noted earlier, a broad stream of continental theorists posit an intimate relation 
between language and death: from Foucault’s assertion concerning the ‘kinship between 
writing and death’ (1977: 116), to Derrida’s Egyptian grammatology and the crucial 
role played by the mythology of Thoth in his deconstruction of onto-theology (see 
Derrida: 1981: 84-94; 1997; Sloterdijk, 2009). For Blanchot, language and literature are 
explicitly conceived as spaces of death; words revealing the finitude of the material 
36 
existences, beings and worlds they paradoxically both present and render absent 
(Blanchot, 1995).  
 
Despite the variety of different articulations and understandings of finitude presented in 
this paper, a common theme has been its function in constructing or sedimenting 
anthropocentric perspectives concerning language, knowledge, and the spatiality proper 
to the human. The implications here are that geographical attempts to write the worlds 
and spaces of both human and nonhuman beings need to become aware of how a 
distinctively anthropocentric notion of finitude ‘grounds’ the epistemological and 
phenomenological basis of that writing. For this reason, I consider finitude to be an 
important geographical notion precisely because the beauty of the geographical 
imagination, as affirmed in Hägerstrand’s article on nature and society, is to radically 
put into question the concepts, histories and assumptions at work in anthropocentric 
thought; to upset the subterraneous epistemological articulation of the earth as the 
‘home’ of ‘man’; and to expose human thought to its limits and ‘outside’ – what 
Quentin Meillassoux has recently described as the ‘great outdoors’ (2008: 7). In short, a 
writing of the earth that takes finitude seriously necessarily troubles the borders and 
limits partitioned through anthropocentric logic. I also consider finitude to be an 
important geographical notion because – precisely on account of its philosophical 
history – it can be used to rethink and rework accounts of ethics that are seeking to 
radically challenge the humanist bases of thought and normative action (cf. Lulka, 
2009). 
 
An important contribution to this discussion of ethics beyond the boundaries of the 
human can be found in Cary Wolfe’s ‘Flesh and Finitude: thinking animals in 
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(post)humanist philosophy’. For Wolfe, thinking finitude offers a way into attempts to 
ethically address the nonhuman in posthumanist philosophies: ‘the fundamental ethical 
bond we have with non-human animals resides in our shared finitude, our vulnerability 
and mortality as ‘fellow creatures’’ (2008: 23)11 The key claim in the context of 
Western ethics is that this shared finitude goes beyond traditional anthropocentric 
distinctions concerning the capacities for reason and language, but falls upon a radical 
passivity for finitude that cannot be said to be a ‘capacity’, ‘attribute’ or ‘property’ of a 
particular being (cf. Greenhough and Roe, 2010; Roe, 2010). Whilst I agree with the 
ethos of Wolfe’s article and its claim that addressing finitude provides an important way 
of developing compassion and ethics beyond human limits, I think it is important, as my 
discussions of Heidegger, Foucault, Bataille and Agamben highlight, to recognise that 
the conceptual history of finitude is not immune from charges of anthropocentrism.   
 
The difficulty of deconstructing anthropocentric perspectives, as Jane Bennett has 
recently outlined in Vibrant Matter, does not solely lie in the task of eliminating 
theological-hierarchical categorizations of life, or of bringing down human hubris. 
Rather, it is that the very posing of the question – speaking about it, naming it, writing it 
– and the related gesture of approaching the independence of animals, matter and the 
‘things themselves’ are both phenomenologically constituted within a human horizon of 
sense. As she describes this correlation: ‘is it not a human subject who is articulating 
this theory of vibrant matter?’ (Bennett, 2010: ix). 
 
Bennett’s answer is to engage in a certain amount of anthropomorphism and animism; 
to extend our intra-human ethical responsibilities to non-humans by, as it were, 
                                                 
11
 As Mike Pearson notes in The Archaeology of Death and Burial, dogs, jackdaws, orang-utans, geese, 
chimpanzees and elephants ‘are all said to exhibit signs of bereavement’ (2005: 146).  
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forgetting any essential abyss between humans, animals and things. In this way, and in 
an interesting reversal of Heidegger’s position concerning the nonhuman, 
anthropomorphism is said to contribute to an erosion of anthropocentrism. As I hope to 
have demonstrated in this paper, finitude is an important conceptual figure in this debate 
because of its historical role in determining the boundaries of the human, and the 
epistemological-phenomenological ways in which entities beyond the human are 
conceived. Rather than making claims about how the notion of finitude is most 
‘authentically’ thought, approached or represented, the paper has aimed to expose and 
question some of the conceptual histories and philosophical perspectives bound up with 
the notion. In so doing, the paper has hopefully demonstrated how the notion insinuates 
itself across a series of key geographical concepts, languages and debates. Further, it 
has claimed that a geographical writing of finitude in turn offers a way of destabilising 
the authentic borders and limits bound up with the notion.  
 
By way of conclusion, I want to briefly outline what I consider to be the ethical promise 
of finitude. Firstly, finitude demands to be thought in terms of a shared exposure to 
death that com-passionately approaches every being beyond any representational 
identification to, or derivation from, an authentic human subjectivity. Here, rather than 
simply acknowledging the anthropocentric basis of finitude and then proclaiming to get 
beyond it so as to “unshackle existence” from finitude – as proposed in the work of 
Badiou – the analytic history of finitude can itself be reworked for the contemporary 
projects of thinking matter, nature and world differently. As the work of Nancy shows, 
to rethink finitude as a shared exposure in this way is to also rethink the spatialities of 
the world. At the same time, a critical deconstruction and un-grounding of the analytic 
history of the notion of finitude helps further trouble and suspend what Agamben refers 
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to as the anthropological machine of ‘suspension’ (2004: 92), with its partitions 
between human and animal, organic and inorganic. Perhaps we can re-read 
Hägerstrand’s affirmation for a geographical thinking of finitude as an important ethical 
project precisely in this light: to question how the spaces and borders of finitude are 
mapped, to consider the ethical consequences of those partitions, and to experiment 
with how a thinking of finitude might write the world differently. 
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